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There are very few who would question whether we need to invest in our ageing infrastructure. However, public opinion toward HS2 is largely negative, with a consistent plurality or outright majority across different polls opposed to the project. Key concerns centre around its escalating costs, perceived poor value for money, and a preference for enhancing existing rail infrastructure over investing in new high-speed lines. But could it have been a different story if we had a different delivery model?
Frustration with government inefficiency in delivering megaprojects fuels opposition, with front-line dissent from residents directly affected by construction, who report intense disruption, environmental harm and emotional distress.
It is difficult to argue with the complaints – originally a high-speed line linking London Euston with Birmingham, Manchester and Leeds, the project has been severely compromised due to spiralling costs, and we will end up, at least initially, with a high-speed line between Old Oak Common, in West London, and Birmingham. When compared to the original brief, it feels not so much a compromise but something of an abject failure.
As such, it is easy to see why for many Britons HS2 has become emblematic of misplaced infrastructure priorities. So, was HS2 doomed from the start or could a different approach have delivered a different outcome?
A different approach
I believe we need to invest heavily in our infrastructure and was in support of high-speed connections between the North and South as originally planned, but like many I have been left disappointed. And so it was with great interest that I read an article in the Independent last week entitled “How the HS2 shambles could have been avoided – if we’d copied the Swiss”. In the article, veteran rail expert Thomas Ableman argues that HS2’s failure stems from its monolithic structure, unreliable Treasury funding, and lack of planning clarity – seen in the absence of a design for Euston and the scrapping of extensions to Manchester and Leeds. He suggests adopting the Swiss model: plan backwards. Start with a plan for a future national rail timetable, establish a guaranteed, predictable annual rail infrastructure budget, and implement incremental, phased projects – a very different approach to the large, siloed mega-schemes that we have a penchant to in the UK. Such an approach, he contends, would allow workable, affordable solutions to emerge and be delivered more reliably, rather than a costly, delayed ‘big bang’ initiative driven by political volatility.
It’s an interesting view, and one that, given the state of play for HS2, is difficult to argue with. All too often our mega projects start with the best of intentions but are subject to the whims of multiple, successive governments and simply fail. I for one, wholeheartedly agree with the need for a long-term strategy and ring-fenced budgets to deliver on these necessary national ambitions, including recognising their affordability and benefit.
Delivering better value
So how do we deliver better value? Firstly, we need to ringfence budgets and find a way to value these projects realistically at the outset. We should not be starting projects without knowing what it’s going to cost with a reasonable level of confidence +/-10%. We then need to drive efficiency in every aspect of delivery. Where parts of the supply chain are under performing, particularly on cost reimbursable contracts, we need the ability to stop or adjust contracts quickly and with minimal impact, awarding or reallocating works to those parties that are meeting delivery targets. With this in place we will have a better framework for delivery.
It feels like it is too late for a new approach on HS2, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be thinking about a new model. The Government needs to realise the impact that Government policy has on the construction industry’s ability to deliver. They need to realise that there are certain decisions that must be based on long-term plans and that perhaps these plans need to be agreed cross-party and then stuck to. We can’t continue to have one party make a decision, only for it to be undone by the next. Maybe infrastructure spend is one of those areas of spend and investment that should be taken out of Government control.
What we need is to create a way of defining and articulating the benefits of long-term spending plans. We then need to be segmenting these schemes and associated workload, finding ways to optimise performance, drive efficiencies, and reduce spend. This must be led by the Government, and there has to be acceptance that the burden of risk on mega projects remains with the client organisation. That means they need the right controls and levers to manage performance within the supply chain without it costing the taxpayer a fortune. Building new contracting strategies that match performance with the reward of additional workload.
I’m personally not that close to the delivery of HS2, although from what I have seen in the trade press, the quality of the work being delivered is exceptional. Last week Colne Valley viaduct was officially completed. At a length of 2.1 miles (3.4 km) and a weight of 116,000 tonnes, it is the largest railway bridge in the UK and is a true feat of engineering and design.
But despite the outstanding quality of what has been delivered, costs continue to spiral, timelines extend, and the works associated with some aspects of the project are still some way from getting started. The main works contractors seem to have the whip hand with limited flexibility within the contracts for the customer, HS2, to make changes and force value for money for the UK taxpayer.
Can HS2 be saved?
So, the big question – can it be saved? Time will tell, but I suspect not based on previous experience. Ultimately, it all comes down to those in charge, rather than those at the coal face delivering. As for that, we must turn to the Government and perhaps say, is it time to have a chat with the Swiss?
Stuart Ladbrook, CEO, Onwave
